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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 








PLEASANTVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-04614) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 2, 2014 
 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 








 William Bell appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint as a 
sanction.  We will affirm. 
  William Bell filed suit against the Pleasantville Housing Authority (“PHA”) 
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alleging that it wrongfully evicted him.  The District Court dismissed his complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but we vacated and remanded after concluding that 
Bell’s complaint raised a federal question—i.e., a due process claim based on his eviction 
in alleged violation of the regulations of the United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”).  See Bell v. Pleasantville Hous. Auth., 443 F. App’x 731, 
735 (3d Cir. 2011). 
On remand, Bell repeatedly failed to appear for his deposition even though the 
District Court appointed counsel to represent him for that purpose.  He also refused to 
respond to the PHA’s discovery requests and to appear for various court-ordered 
conferences.  The Magistrate Judge finally convened a show cause hearing, at which Bell 
also failed to appear.  The Magistrate Judge continued the hearing and, when Bell finally 
appeared, gave Bell one last chance to appear for his deposition.  When Bell again failed 
to do so, the PHA filed a third motion to dismiss Bell’s complaint as a sanction under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).  Bell did not oppose the motion (or the PHA’s prior 
motions), and the Magistrate Judge recommended granting it.  Bell also did not object to 
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and the District Court adopted it and dismissed 
his complaint.  The District Court later granted the PHA’s request to withdraw its 
counterclaim, and Bell appeals from that final order. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
dismissal of a complaint as a sanction for abuse of discretion.  See Poulis v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  In this case, the District Court 
3 
 
properly recognized that dismissal is a drastic sanction to be imposed as a last resort, but 
it carefully balanced the factors set forth in Poulis and concluded that dismissal was 
warranted in light of Bell’s repeated failures to appear for his deposition and to respond 
to PHA’s discovery requests.  Bell does not challenge the District Court’s application of 
the Poulis factors, and the District Court acted well within its discretion in dismissing his 
complaint for the reasons the Magistrate Judge adequately explained. 
Bell’s sole argument on appeal is that the Fair Housing Act and HUD’s policies 
and regulations confer on him a “privilege to refuse to answer discovery and appear for 
deposition.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 1.)  He contends in that regard that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not govern this action.  Bell did not raise that argument below, and 
there is no support for it.  The Fair Housing Act authorizes aggrieved persons to 
commence a “civil action” in, inter alia, “an appropriate United States district court[.]”  
42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure 
in all civil actions . . . in the United States district courts[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.  Those 
rules, including the discovery obligations they impose, are thus fully applicable in this 
civil action.  Bell’s unsupported assertion to the contrary is frivolous and serves only to 
further demonstrate the willfulness of his refusal to comply with his obligations. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
